implement dnssec-awareness throughout code, and dane for incoming/outgoing mail delivery

the vendored dns resolver code is a copy of the go stdlib dns resolver, with
awareness of the "authentic data" (i.e. dnssec secure) added, as well as support
for enhanced dns errors, and looking up tlsa records (for dane). ideally it
would be upstreamed, but the chances seem slim.

dnssec-awareness is added to all packages, e.g. spf, dkim, dmarc, iprev. their
dnssec status is added to the Received message headers for incoming email.

but the main reason to add dnssec was for implementing dane. with dane, the
verification of tls certificates can be done through certificates/public keys
published in dns (in the tlsa records). this only makes sense (is trustworthy)
if those dns records can be verified to be authentic.

mox now applies dane to delivering messages over smtp. mox already implemented
mta-sts for webpki/pkix-verification of certificates against the (large) pool
of CA's, and still enforces those policies when present. but it now also checks
for dane records, and will verify those if present. if dane and mta-sts are
both absent, the regular opportunistic tls with starttls is still done. and the
fallback to plaintext is also still done.

mox also makes it easy to setup dane for incoming deliveries, so other servers
can deliver with dane tls certificate verification. the quickstart now
generates private keys that are used when requesting certificates with acme.
the private keys are pre-generated because they must be static and known during
setup, because their public keys must be published in tlsa records in dns.
autocert would generate private keys on its own, so had to be forked to add the
option to provide the private key when requesting a new certificate. hopefully
upstream will accept the change and we can drop the fork.

with this change, using the quickstart to setup a new mox instance, the checks
at internet.nl result in a 100% score, provided the domain is dnssec-signed and
the network doesn't have any issues.

vendor/golang.org/x/sys/windows/exec_windows.go

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import (
 //     but only if there is space or tab inside s.
 func EscapeArg(s string) string {
 	if len(s) == 0 {
-		return "\"\""
+		return `""`
 	}
 	n := len(s)
 	hasSpace := false
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ func EscapeArg(s string) string {
 		}
 	}
 	if hasSpace {
-		n += 2
+		n += 2 // Reserve space for quotes.
 	}
 	if n == len(s) {
 		return s
@@ -82,20 +82,68 @@ func EscapeArg(s string) string {
 // in CreateProcess's CommandLine argument, CreateService/ChangeServiceConfig's BinaryPathName argument,
 // or any program that uses CommandLineToArgv.
 func ComposeCommandLine(args []string) string {
-	var commandLine string
-	for i := range args {
-		if i > 0 {
-			commandLine += " "
-		}
-		commandLine += EscapeArg(args[i])
+	if len(args) == 0 {
+		return ""
 	}
-	return commandLine
+
+	// Per https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/shellapi/nf-shellapi-commandlinetoargvw:
+	// “This function accepts command lines that contain a program name; the
+	// program name can be enclosed in quotation marks or not.”
+	//
+	// Unfortunately, it provides no means of escaping interior quotation marks
+	// within that program name, and we have no way to report them here.
+	prog := args[0]
+	mustQuote := len(prog) == 0
+	for i := 0; i < len(prog); i++ {
+		c := prog[i]
+		if c <= ' ' || (c == '"' && i == 0) {
+			// Force quotes for not only the ASCII space and tab as described in the
+			// MSDN article, but also ASCII control characters.
+			// The documentation for CommandLineToArgvW doesn't say what happens when
+			// the first argument is not a valid program name, but it empirically
+			// seems to drop unquoted control characters.
+			mustQuote = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	var commandLine []byte
+	if mustQuote {
+		commandLine = make([]byte, 0, len(prog)+2)
+		commandLine = append(commandLine, '"')
+		for i := 0; i < len(prog); i++ {
+			c := prog[i]
+			if c == '"' {
+				// This quote would interfere with our surrounding quotes.
+				// We have no way to report an error, so just strip out
+				// the offending character instead.
+				continue
+			}
+			commandLine = append(commandLine, c)
+		}
+		commandLine = append(commandLine, '"')
+	} else {
+		if len(args) == 1 {
+			// args[0] is a valid command line representing itself.
+			// No need to allocate a new slice or string for it.
+			return prog
+		}
+		commandLine = []byte(prog)
+	}
+
+	for _, arg := range args[1:] {
+		commandLine = append(commandLine, ' ')
+		// TODO(bcmills): since we're already appending to a slice, it would be nice
+		// to avoid the intermediate allocations of EscapeArg.
+		// Perhaps we can factor out an appendEscapedArg function.
+		commandLine = append(commandLine, EscapeArg(arg)...)
+	}
+	return string(commandLine)
 }
 
 // DecomposeCommandLine breaks apart its argument command line into unescaped parts using CommandLineToArgv,
 // as gathered from GetCommandLine, QUERY_SERVICE_CONFIG's BinaryPathName argument, or elsewhere that
 // command lines are passed around.
-// DecomposeCommandLine returns error if commandLine contains NUL.
+// DecomposeCommandLine returns an error if commandLine contains NUL.
 func DecomposeCommandLine(commandLine string) ([]string, error) {
 	if len(commandLine) == 0 {
 		return []string{}, nil
@@ -105,18 +153,35 @@ func DecomposeCommandLine(commandLine string) ([]string, error) {
 		return nil, errorspkg.New("string with NUL passed to DecomposeCommandLine")
 	}
 	var argc int32
-	argv, err := CommandLineToArgv(&utf16CommandLine[0], &argc)
+	argv, err := commandLineToArgv(&utf16CommandLine[0], &argc)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	defer LocalFree(Handle(unsafe.Pointer(argv)))
+
 	var args []string
-	for _, v := range (*argv)[:argc] {
-		args = append(args, UTF16ToString((*v)[:]))
+	for _, p := range unsafe.Slice(argv, argc) {
+		args = append(args, UTF16PtrToString(p))
 	}
 	return args, nil
 }
 
+// CommandLineToArgv parses a Unicode command line string and sets
+// argc to the number of parsed arguments.
+//
+// The returned memory should be freed using a single call to LocalFree.
+//
+// Note that although the return type of CommandLineToArgv indicates 8192
+// entries of up to 8192 characters each, the actual count of parsed arguments
+// may exceed 8192, and the documentation for CommandLineToArgvW does not mention
+// any bound on the lengths of the individual argument strings.
+// (See https://go.dev/issue/63236.)
+func CommandLineToArgv(cmd *uint16, argc *int32) (argv *[8192]*[8192]uint16, err error) {
+	argp, err := commandLineToArgv(cmd, argc)
+	argv = (*[8192]*[8192]uint16)(unsafe.Pointer(argp))
+	return argv, err
+}
+
 func CloseOnExec(fd Handle) {
 	SetHandleInformation(Handle(fd), HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT, 0)
 }