when suggesting CAA records for a domain, suggest variants that bind to the account id and with validation methods used by mox

should prevent potential mitm attacks. especially when done close to the
machine itself (where a http/tls challenge is intercepted to get a valid
certificate), as seen on the internet last month.
This commit is contained in:
Mechiel Lukkien
2023-12-21 15:16:30 +01:00
parent ca97293cb2
commit db3fef4981
11 changed files with 123 additions and 28 deletions

View File

@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ sed -i -e 's/moxtest1@mox1.example: nil/moxtest1@mox1.example: nil\n\t\t\tpostfi
(
cat /integration/example.zone;
sed -n '/^;/,/CAA /p' output.txt |
sed -n '/^;/,/will be suggested/p' output.txt |
# allow sending from postfix for mox1.example.
sed 's/mox1.example. *TXT "v=spf1 mx ~all"/mox1.example. TXT "v=spf1 mx ip4:172.28.1.70 ~all"/'
) >/integration/example-integration.zone

View File

@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ TLS:
EOF
# A fresh file was set up by moxacmepebble.
sed -n '/^;/,/CAA /p' output.txt >>/integration/example-integration.zone
sed -n '/^;/,/will be suggested/p' output.txt >>/integration/example-integration.zone
unbound-control -s 172.28.1.30 reload # reload unbound with zone file changes
mox -checkconsistency serve &