- the rfc links back to the code now show any "todo" text that appears in the
code. helps when looking at an rfc to find any work that may need to be done.
- html pages can now be generated to view code and rfc's side by side. clicking
on links in one side opens the linked document in the other page, at the
correct line number.
i'll be publishing the "dev" html version (latest commit on main branch) on the
mox website, updated with each commit. the dev pages will also link to the
latest released version.
- dmarc reports: add a cid to the log line about one run of sending reports, and log line for each report
- in smtpclient, also handle tls errors from the first read after a handshake. we appear to sometimes get tls alerts about bad certificates on the first read.
- for messages to dmarc/tls reporting addresses that we think should/can not be processed as reports, add an X-Mox- header explaining the reason.
- tls reports: send report messages with From address of postmaster at an actually configured domain for the mail host. and only send reports when dkim signing is configured for that domain. the domain is also the submitter domain. the rfc seems to require dkim-signing with an exact match with the message from and submitter.
- for incoming tls reports, in the smtp server, we do allow a dkim-signature domain that is higher-level (up to publicsuffix) of the message from domain. so we are stricter in what we send than what we receive.
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
this also has changes to make the dmarc report sending implementation more
similar to the tls reports implementation.
- factor out code to compose a dmarc report message to the message package
(from dmarcdb for reports), it will be shared soon.
- spread emails with dmarc reports over 45 minutes (it runs hourly), with at
most 5 mins in between reports. to prevent bursts of messages. properly abort
all sending attempts at mox shutdown.
- add use of missing error details in an error path.
- fix dmarc report message subject header by adding missing <>'s around report-id.
- fix dmarc report attachment filename syntax by leaving "unique-id" out.
firstly by using crypto/rand in those cases. and secondly by putting a lock
around the Read (though it isn't used at the moment).
found while working while implementing sending tls reports.
we were trying to offset the timezone, but that makes no sense: we already
created a date in the local timezone based on (milli)seconds passed. so we can
just use that date instead of calculating a wrong date.
before this change, a message in the rejects folder that was read and marked as
notjunk (e.g. automatically by webmail), could cause a dmarc report to be sent
for another junky message from the domain. we now require positive signals to
be for messages not in the rejects mailbox.
the text/plain body of a dmarc report contains the period, but it was in local
time while claiming to be in utc. make it utc, so we often get nicely rounded
whole 24h utc days.
by fixing a typo in the content-type...
and by recognizing the application/x-zip that is detected as content-type.
discovered when a dmarc report from aws ses wasn't processed.
it seems aws ses was sending a dmarc report because it received a dmarc report.
- more eagerly report about overrides, so domain owners can better tell that
switching from p=none to p=reject will not cause trouble for these messages.
- report multiple reasons, e.g. mailing list and sampled out
- in dmarc analysis for rejects from first-time senders (possibly spammers),
fix the conditional check on nonjunk messages.
- in evaluations view in admin, show unaligned spf pass in yellow too and a few
more small tweaks.
"fatal" was meant as "we need fatal for the connection, it will be dropped".
but it sounds more serious, as if something needs to be fixed.
hopefully enough for issue #39 by ArnoSen
e.g. typical setup is a hostname mail.<domain>. and dsns can be sent from
postmaster@mail.<domain>. so it helps to look for dkim keys for <domain>, and
use them when signing. instead of looking for dkim keys for mail.<domain>,
which won't typically exist. similar to recent commit that added outgoing
dmarc aggregate reports.
in smtpserver, we store dmarc evaluations (under the right conditions).
in dmarcdb, we periodically (hourly) send dmarc reports if there are
evaluations. for failed deliveries, we deliver the dsn quietly to a submailbox
of the postmaster mailbox.
this is on by default, but can be disabled in mox.conf.
the underscores aren't valid, but have been seen in the wild, so we have a
workaround for them. there are limitations, it won't work with idna domains.
and if the domain has other policies, like mta-sts, the mx host won't pass
either.
after report from richard g about delivery issue, thanks!
given they are not part of the domain name (to which idna applies).
only the part after _domainkey may be idna.
found after going through code after report about mx targets with underscores
from richard g.
with requiretls, the tls verification mode/rules for email deliveries can be
changed by the sender/submitter. in two ways:
1. "requiretls" smtp extension to always enforce verified tls (with mta-sts or
dnssec+dane), along the entire delivery path until delivery into the final
destination mailbox (so entire transport is verified-tls-protected).
2. "tls-required: no" message header, to ignore any tls and tls verification
errors even if the recipient domain has a policy that requires tls verification
(mta-sts and/or dnssec+dane), allowing delivery of non-sensitive messages in
case of misconfiguration/interoperability issues (at least useful for sending
tls reports).
we enable requiretls by default (only when tls is active), for smtp and
submission. it can be disabled through the config.
for each delivery attempt, we now store (per recipient domain, in the account
of the sender) whether the smtp server supports starttls and requiretls. this
support is shown (after having sent a first message) in the webmail when
sending a message (the previous 3 bars under the address input field are now 5
bars, the first for starttls support, the last for requiretls support). when
all recipient domains for a message are known to implement requiretls,
requiretls is automatically selected for sending (instead of "default" tls
behaviour). users can also select the "fallback to insecure" to add the
"tls-required: no" header.
new metrics are added for insight into requiretls errors and (some, not yet
all) cases where tls-required-no ignored a tls/verification error.
the admin can change the requiretls status for messages in the queue. so with
default delivery attempts, when verified tls is required by failing, an admin
could potentially change the field to "tls-required: no"-behaviour.
messages received (over smtp) with the requiretls option, get a comment added
to their Received header line, just before "id", after "with".
the bar is currently showing 3 properties:
1. mta-sts enforced;
2. mx lookup returned dnssec-signed response;
3. first delivery destination host has dane records
the colors are: red for not-implemented, green for implemented, gray for error,
nothing for unknown/irrelevant.
the plan is to implement "requiretls" soon and start caching per domain whether
delivery can be done with starttls and whether the domain supports requiretls.
and show that in two new parts of the bar.
thanks to damian poddebniak for pointing out that security indicators should
always be visible, not only for positive/negative result. otherwise users won't
notice their absence.
so full name/email address is visible.
using a hidden grid element that gets the same content as the input element.
from https://css-tricks.com/auto-growing-inputs-textareas/
a recent commit probably also make the compose window full-screen-width on
chrome, this restores to the intended behaviour of a less wide default size.
if you add multiple address fields, the compose window will still grow. not
great, in the future, we should make the compose window resizable by dragging.
because the txt would already follow cnames.
the additional cname lookup didn't hurt, it just didn't do anything.
i probably didn't realize that before looking deeper into dns.
the original next-hop domain. not anything after resolving cname's, because
then it takes just a single injected dns cname record to lead us to an
unrelated server (that we would verify, but it's the wrong server).
also don't fallback to just strict tls when something is wrong. we must use the
policy to check if an mx host is allowed. the whole idea is that unsigned dns
records cannot be trusted.
i noticed this while implementing dane.
