should prevent potential mitm attacks. especially when done close to the
machine itself (where a http/tls challenge is intercepted to get a valid
certificate), as seen on the internet last month.
so a single user cannot fill up the disk.
by default, there is (still) no limit. a default can be set in the config file
for all accounts, and a per-account max size can be set that would override any
global setting.
this does not take into account disk usage of the index database. and also not
of any file system overhead.
OLDNAME is included in IMAP4rev2, but not in IMAP4rev1. it is also included in
the NOTIFY extension, but we don't implement that yet.
found by Damian Poddebniak with https://github.com/duesee/imap-flow, thanks!
when writing the 4xx temporary error line, we were taking 1s in between each
byte. the total line could take longer than 30 seconds, which is the timeout we
use for reading a whole line (regardless of individual bytes). so mox as
deliverer was timing out to mox as slow rejecter. this causes slow writes to
not take longer than the 30s timeout: if we are 2s before the 30s, we write the
remainder in one go.
based on a debug log from naturalethic, thanks!
- prometheus is now behind an interface, they aren't dependencies for the
reusable components anymore.
- some dependencies have been inverted: instead of packages importing a main
package to get configuration, the main package now sets configuration in
these packages. that means fewer internals are pulled in.
- some functions now have new parameters for values that were retrieved from
package "mox-".
we don't want external software to include internal details like mlog.
slog.Logger is/will be the standard.
we still have mlog for its helper functions, and its handler that logs in
concise logfmt used by mox.
packages that are not meant for reuse still pass around mlog.Log for
convenience.
we use golang.org/x/exp/slog because we also support the previous Go toolchain
version. with the next Go release, we'll switch to the builtin slog.
we already allowed it for (authenticated) SMTP submission. it turns out also
legitimate senders can use this invalid syntax to deliver messages.
for issue #101 by Fell, thanks for reporting & explaining!
the original size, with bare newlines, was stored in the database, not the
actual adjusted file size. this caused failures when reading the message.
users may want to run "mox fixmsgsize <account>" if they imported messages from
another account over IMAP.
reported by daftaupe, thanks!
i'm not sure this is good enough.
this is based on field MsgFromValidation, but it doesn't hold the full DMARC information.
we also don't know mailing list-status for all historic messages.
so the red underline can occur too often.
both cases are quite typical for spammers, and not for legitimate senders.
this doesn't apply to known senders. and it only requires that the content look
more like ham instead of spam. so legitimate mail can still get through with
these properties.
because that is what most of the code expects. we could work around having bare
lf, but it would complicate too much code.
currently, a message with bare lf is accepted (in smtpserver delivery,
imapserver append, etc), but when an imap session would try to fetch parsed
parts, that would fail because and even cause a imapserver panic (closing the
connection).
in message imports we would already convert bare lf to crlf (because it is
expected those messages are all lf-only-ending).
we store messages with crlf-ending instead of lf-ending so the imapserver has
all correct information at hand (line counts, byte counts).
found by using emclient with mox. it adds a message to the inbox that can have
mixed crlf and bare lf line endings in a few header fields (in some
localization, emclient authors explained how that happened, thanks!). we can
now convert those lines and read those messages over imap. emclient already
switched to all-crlf line endings in newer (development) versions.
based on discussion on uta mailing list. it seems the intention of the tlsrpt
is to only send reports to recipient domains. but i was able to interpret the
tlsrpt rfc as sending reports to mx hosts too ("policy domain", and because it
makes sense given how DANE works per MX host, not recipient domain). this
change makes the behaviour of outgoing reports to recipient domains work more
in line with expectations most folks may have about tls reporting (i.e. also
include per-mx host tlsa policies in the report). this also keeps reports to mx
hosts working, and makes them more useful by including the recipient domains of
affected deliveries.
anything that looks like it specifies a different host should not be loaded.
www.xmox.nl also has a CSP policy that should prevent resources from other
domains from being loaded.
- show commit hash, with a link to the commit
- highlight if this is the dev or released version page
- sort the rfc's, the list in rfc/index.txt has the major rfc's at the topic, but this nuance is lost in the html page
for reporting addresses that cause DSNs to be returned. that just adds noise.
the admin can add/remove/extend addresses through the webadmin.
in the future, we could send reports with a smtp mail from of
"postmaster+<signed-encoded-recipient>@...", and add the reporting recipient
on the suppression list automatically when a DSN comes in on that address, but
for now this will probably do.
so facilitate debugging. a remote client that logs details about failing
connections can give the cid to the mox operator to find the relevant logging.
instead of requiring policy domains to be configured recipient domains.
when accessing TLS reports, always do it under path #tlsrpt/reports, not under #domain/.../tlsrpt.
